International licensing and R&D subsidy by Fan, Cuihong & Zhang, Zhentang
www.ssoar.info
International licensing and R&D subsidy
Fan, Cuihong; Zhang, Zhentang
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Fan, C., & Zhang, Z. (1999). International licensing and R&D subsidy. (Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum
Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie, 99-28). Berlin:
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-124912
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
 discussion papers 
 
FS IV 99 – 28  
International Licensing and R&D Subsidy 
 
 
Cuihong Fan * 
Zhentang Zhang ** 
          
 
* Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany 
** WZB - Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin 
          
October 2002 
 
 
 
 
ISSN Nr. 0722 - 6748 
 
 Forschungsschwerpunkt 
 Markt und politische Ökonomie  
   
 Research Area 
 Markets and Political Economy 
 Zitierweise/Citation: 
 
Cuihong Fan and Zhentang Zhang, International Licensing 
and R&D Subsidy, Discussion Paper FS IV 99-28, 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 2002. 
 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH, 
Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Germany, Tel. (030) 2 54 91 – 0 
Internet:  www.wz-berlin.de  
ii 
ABSTRACT 
International Licensing and R&D Subsidy* 
by Cuihong Fan and Zhentang Zhang 
R&D rivalry and optimal R&D policies are investigated in an asymmetric four-stage 
game that involves international licensing. It is found that a government’s R&D policy 
crucially depends on its domestic firm’s bargaining power over the licensing gain. 
When the firm’s bargaining power is greater than one half, the government subsidizes 
its home firm’s R&D investment, while imposes a tax if the firm’s bargaining power is 
less than one half. Additionally, this result does not depend on the status of the firm (the 
licensor or the licensee). Finally, the effects of two different licensing contracts (fixed-
fee v.s. royalty per unit) on governments’ optimal R&D policies are investigated. 
 
Keywords: International Licensing, R&D Subsidy, R&D Investment 
JEL Classification: L13, O34 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Internationale Lizenzierungen und F&E Beihilfen 
Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit Innovationswettbewerb und der Rolle von nationaler 
Politik im Falle von internationalen Lizenzierungspraktiken.  In einem mehrstufigen 
Spiel werden die Anreizmechanismen untersucht. Es stellt sich heraus, daß die 
Verhandlungsstärke der nationalen Unternehmen im Lizenzierungsmarkt eine wichtige 
Rolle spielen.  So erfolgt aus nationaler Sicht eine Subvention (Besteuerung) von F&E-
Investitionen immer dann, wenn die Verhandlungsmacht groß (klein) ist.  Darüber 
hinaus untersucht der Beitrag die Konsequenzen unterschiedlicher Lizenzierungs-
praktiken auf die optimale nationale F&E-Politik. 
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1 Introduction
Licensing is a voluntary form of technology dissemination whereby an inno-
vator can benefit from selling its superior technology to other firms through
licensing contracts. In the last few decades licensing has become an im-
portant activity in many high-tech industries where licensing is used by the
firms as a principal way of profiting from their innovations. The licensing
revenues of those industries have increased rapidly, for example, in 1996 alone
US industry received $136.3 billion in royalties from domestic and interna-
tional licensees (Degnan, 1998). The licensing income of US corporations
from foreign unaﬃliated entities has grown steadily over the past few years,
especially in the computer software industry, where the annual growth rate
was at 12 % during the period of 1985-1996. Meanwhile, these high-tech in-
dustries are facing fierce competition in international markets and have been
receiving substantial amount of R&D subsidies from their governments in
various forms. To access the impact of R&D subsidies on these R&D and
licensing-intensive industries, one needs to develop a model, which embeds
not only firms’ R&D rivalry but also their licensing activities.
The interdependence of governments’ R&D policy and firms’ R&D rivalry
in an international context has been studied for almost two decades. In
their seminal work on strategic trade policy, Brander and Spencer (1983)
have shown that firms’ strategic R&D competition1 induces governments
to subsidize their domestic firms’ R&D investments. Cheng (1987) exam-
ines a dynamic version of their model with R&D spillovers and reinforces
their results. Bagwell and Staiger (1994) extend the Spencer-Brander model
to oligopolistic market with R&D uncertainty. They conclude that govern-
ments subsidize their home firms’ cost-reducing R&D activities regardless of
the nature of the downstream competition (Bertrand or Cournot). Qiu and
Tao (1998) prove that the R&D cooperation even raises the governments’
incentives to subsidize their firms’ R&D investments.
In industries where both international licensing and government R&D sub-
sidy are present, it is important to understand how firms’ licensing decisions
1Strategic R&D competition means that firms involve at first in R&D competition and
then in product competition. R&D competition is nonstrategic if R&D and output are
simultaneously determined.
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aﬀect governments’ R&D policies, and vice versa. We set up a four-stage
game with two governments and two firms, who sell their products in a third
country. These firms have diﬀerent R&D eﬃciencies and have the possi-
bility of purchasing the more advanced technology from their rival through
international licensing.
The following three questions are addressed in this paper. (1) Should a
government subsidize or tax its firm’s R&D investment given the feasibility of
international licensing? (2) Should a less eﬃcient firm buy a new technology
or develop it itself? (3) Are governments’ R&D policies contingent on the
type of licensing contracts, i.e. fixed-fee v.s. royalty per unit contract?
We find that firms’ bargaining power plays a pivotal role in designing the
governments’ R&D policies. A government should subsidize a domestic firm’s
R&D activities whenever the firm appropriates higher share of licensing gain
as compared to its rival firm; while imposing a tax whenever its domestic firm
benefits less from the licensing than the foreign firm. When both firms have
the same bargaining power, i.e., when the Nash bargaining solution prevails,
both governments should stay laissez-faire.
This result is driven by two eﬀects: a competition eﬀect and a licensing
eﬀect. Due to the competition eﬀect, an increase in a government’s R&D
subsidy reduces the rival’s R&D investment. However, licensing reduces both
firms’ production costs and thus enables a firm to benefit from the superior
technology of its rival. Due to the licensing eﬀect, a government’s R&D
subsidy has a positive eﬀect on the rival firm’s R&D investment. Therefore,
the competition eﬀect encourages the government to subsidize its firm’s R&D
activity; while the licensing eﬀect induces the government to levy a tax on
R&D investment. The overall eﬀect by which the types (subsidy or tax)
of the governments’ R&D policies are determined depends on how the total
licensing gain is divided. This result is quite diﬀerent from those in R&D
subsidy literature where the possibility of international licensing is ignored
and only the competition eﬀect is considered.
Furthermore, we show that whether the less eﬃcient firm (firm 2) will develop
a new technology itself or buy it from the more eﬃcient firm (firm 1) depends
both on its bargaining power and its R&D cost. Firm 2 will innovate if it has
most of the bargaining power over the licensing gain. With higher bargaining
power, firm 2’s R&D investment will be subsidized and hence the asymmetry
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between the firms’ research capabilities becomes small. If firm 1 has higher
bargaining power and firm 2’s R&D cost is suﬃciently high, firm 2 prefers
not to invest in R&D.
In the case of both firms’ innovating, the less eﬃcient firm may leapfrog the
more eﬃcient firm in the innovation market and becomes licensor, under the
condition that the less eﬃcient firm’s bargaining power is suﬃciently large
and the diﬀerence in R&D cost between the firms is suﬃciently small.
The robustness of this result is investigated under two diﬀerent types of
licensing contracts: fixed-fee licensing and royalty per-unit licensing. It is
found that the type of optimal R&D policies (subsidy or tax) is not contingent
on the type of licensing contracts. That is, the government subsidizes (taxes)
its firm’s R&D activities, as long as its firm’s bargaining power over licensing
gain is greater (less) than a half, no matter whether the firms engage in
fixed-fee or royalty per-unit licensing. However, the optimal amount of R&D
subsidy or tax are diﬀerent under diﬀerent licensing contracts.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we set up the basic model.
In Section 3 we analyze the governments’ optimal R&D policies as well as
firms’ R&D rivalry and licensing decisions under fixed-fee licensing contract.
In Section 4 we study them under royalty-per-unit licensing contract. In
Section 5 we conclude.
The Model
In this section, a basic model of R&D competition with patent licensing and
government intervention in international markets is developed.
There are two governments and one firm in each of these countries. Gov-
ernments choose their R&D policies, firms make innovation and licensing
decisions and then play a Cournot duopoly game. Following the literature
on strategic trade policy we adopt the ”third-market model”2 and assume
2In a third-market model, a domestic government can do nothing to directly hinder a
foreign firm, (i.e. there is no room for import tariﬀs or quotas), and the natural policy to
consider is R&D subsidy policy, which will strategically aﬀects the foreign firm’s decision
on R&D investment. (See Brander 1995)
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that the two rival firms from two countries compete exclusively in a third
market.
Each government maximizes its social welfare, Gi, which is the diﬀerence
between its domestic firm’s profit πi and the amount of R&D subsidy3. That
is,
Gi = πi − sixi, i = 1, 2 (1)
where si is the subsidy rate and xi is firm i’s R&D investment.
Firms’ unit costs c are identical and constant. However, their R&D invest-
ment eﬃciencies are diﬀerent and represented by v1, v2, where v1 6= v2. The
eﬃciency measure of R&D investment can be interpreted as firm i0s R&D
unit cost. Without loss of generality, firm 1 is taken to be more eﬃcient in
its R&D, v1 < v2. The market demand function is linear, p = a−Q, where
Q = q1 + q2.
Firm i’s payoﬀ without licensing is
π0i = pqi − (c− f(xi))qi − (vi − si)xi (2)
where f(xi), i = 1, 2 is firm i’s cost reduction due to xi units of R&D in-
vestment. It is assumed that f(xi) ≤ c. R&D investment is subject to
diminishing returns, i.e. f
0
(xi) > 0 and f
00
(xi) < 0. For simplicity, hereafter
we specify the R&D production function by the form
f(xi) =
√
xi.
After licensing, each firm maximizes its total payoﬀ (profit plus licensing
gain). For the time being, we consider fixed-fee licensing. The licensing
gain E under fixed-fee licensing is the diﬀerence between the highest fee the
licensee is willing to pay and the lowest fee the licensor is willing to accept,
this diﬀerence happens to be the industry’s incremental profit. Let firm i be
the licensor and firm j the licensee, then
E = π(c− fi, c− fi)− πi(c− fi, c− fj)− πj(c− fi, c− fj), (3)
3Since it is assumed that the firms are competing in a third market, consumer surplus
is not concluded in governments’ objective function.
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where π(c−fi, c−fi) = 2πi(c−fi, c−fi), and πi(c−fi, c−fj) = (a−c+2fi−fj)
2
9
.
The firms’ total payoﬀs depend on their share (β) of the total licensing gain
(E) and are given as follows:
πT1 = π
0
1 + βE (4)
πT2 = π
0
2 + (1− β)E (5)
Under fixed-fee licensing, the firms’ total payoﬀs can also be rewritten as
πT1 = π1(c− f1, c− f2)− (v1 − s1)x1 + βE (6)
πT2 = π2(c− f1, c− f2)− (v2 − s2)x2 + (1− β)E (7)
Here β is firm 1’s bargaining power over the licensing gain and (1−β) is firm
2’s bargaining power, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. For extreme values of β = 0 or β = 1, it
implies that one of the firms gets all the licensing gain from the trade while
the other firm is made indiﬀerent between accepting or rejecting the licensing
deal. The Nash bargaining solution corresponds to β = 1
2
. If the licensor (say,
firm 1) has all the bargaining power (β = 1), then the fixed fee equals the
licensee’s incremental profit, i.e. F = π2(c− f1, c− f1)−π2(c− f1, c− f2). If
the bargaining power lie between 0 and 1, then the licensee’s fixed fee will be
F ∗ = βE+π1(c− f1, c− f2)−π1(c− f1, c− f1), which is the licensor’s share
of licensing gain plus its profit lose due to fixed-fee licensing. From F ∗, if the
licensee has all the bargaining power, it will only pay the amount of what
the licensor loses due to fixed-fee licensing and thereby the licensor is made
indiﬀerent between licensing and not licensing. Therefore, the equations (7)
and (8) are equivalent to
πT1 = π1(c− f1, c− f1)− (v1 − s1)x1 + F ∗ and
πT2 = π2(c− f1, c− f1)− (v2 − s2)x2 − F ∗.
The market game is a multistage game with observed actions and complete
information. It has four stages.
5
• Stage 1, governments simultaneously choose their R&D subsidies (
R&D subsidy stage).
• Stage 2, firms simultaneously choose their R&D investments knowing
the R&D subsidies in both countries (Innovation stage).
• Stage 3, firms engage in licensing activities (Licensing stage).
• Stage 4, firms play a Cournot duopoly game (Production stage).
Our solution concept is that of subgame perfect equilibrium.
Solution to the game
Before solving the game, it is necessary to make clear how firms’ decisions on
R&D investment are influenced by the possibility of licensing. In strategic
R&D rivalry, each firm’s incentive to innovate depends on the actions of its
rival. When a firm believes that its rival does not innovate, it will surely
invest in R&D because the payoﬀ as a Stackelberg leader is greater than the
payoﬀ when no firm were to innovate. Therefore, neither firm innovating is no
equilibrium in R&D rivalry. When a firm believes that its rival will innovate,
the firm will innovate too, since the payoﬀ as a Stackelberg follower is smaller
than the payoﬀ it would earn when both firms innovate. Thus, in the absence
of licensing, both firms will invest in R&D and tend to overuse their R&D
investments in the sense that more R&D is used than required to minimize
total costs (Spencer and Brander (1983).
However, allowing for international licensing, the above equilibrium in R&D
rivalry will be altered. When a firm knows that it will become a licensee
if it does not innovate, the expectation of being a licensee will dampen its
incentives to innovate as long as the licensor does not appropriate all the
licensing gain. If the firm can develop a new technology only very ineﬃciently,
i.e. if its R&D cost is relatively high, then the non-innovating firm’s payoﬀ (as
a licensee) may exceed its payoﬀwhen both firms were to innovate. Therefore,
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given the feasibility of licensing, both firms investing in R&D may not be an
equilibrium in R&D rivalry4.
In this game, where both licensing and the governments’ intervention in R&D
investment are concerned, there are two cases to consider. Case 1, both firms
invest in R&D; Case 2, only one firm innovates.
We solve this model by backward induction. To simplify the cases, we assume
in this model that the firms’ R&D costs are relatively high (vi ≥ 14−3β18 ) and
the firms’ eﬀective R&D eﬃciencies are similar such that fixed-fee licensing
will occur5.
In the Production stage, the firms choose output levels, taking R&D levels
as given by the preceding stage. Before licensing, the firms maximize their
before-licensing profit π0i , yielding the following equilibrium outputs
6:
qB0i =
a− c+ 2fBi − fBj
3
, i, j = 1, 2 (8)
where fBi = f
B(xi) and fBj = f
B(xj).
If only one firm (firm i) innovates, then
q0i =
a− c+ 2fi
3
, and q0j =
a− c− fi
3
(9)
After licensing, both firms use the licensor’s (firm i’s) technology and their
equilibrium outputs are7:
qBFi = q
BF
j =
(a− c+ fBi )
3
, (10)
4In a dynamic game on R&D rivalry, Katz and Shapiro (1987) also point out that one
firm may prefer losing to winning a patent race when there is possibility of licensing.
5The case where licensing occurs is the most relevant case in this paper. R&D rivalry
and optimal R&D subsidy policy in the absence of licensing have been considered by
Spencer and Brander (1983) and many other works in R&D subsidy literature.
6Here ”B” stands for both firms investing in R&D.
7Here ”BF” means that both firms innovate and fixed-fee licensing occurs.
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where firm i is the licensor and firm j the licensee.
With one firm innovating, the firms’ outputs after fixed-fee licensing have the
same form as equation (10) but with a diﬀerent amount of cost reduction fi.
In the third stage, the firms engage in licensing if and only if the net gain from
licensing is positive (i.e. E ≥ 0). Under fixed-fee licensing, firm i (licensor)
licenses its technology to firm j (licensee) if and only if
fBi ≤
2(a− c) + 5fBj
3
. (11)
In the case of nearly drastic innovation (
2(a−c)+5fBj
3
< fBi < a− c + 2fBj ) or
drastic innovation (fBi ≥ a − c + 2fBj ), no licensing will occur. If only one
firm innovates, then the condition for fixed-fee licensing to occur is
fi ≤
2(a− c)
3
. (12)
In the Innovation stage, each firm choose the optimal level of R&D investment
to maximize its total payoﬀ. The firms’s total payoﬀ when both of them
innovate are:
πBTi =
(a− c+ 2fBi − fBj )2
9
+ β
(fBi − fBj )
£
2(a− c)− 3fBi + 5fBj
¤
9
− (vi − sBi )xBi (13)
πBTj =
(a− c+ 2fBj − fBi )2
9
+ (1− β)
(fBi − fBj )
£
2(a− c)− 3fBi + 5fBj
¤
9
− (vj − sBj )xBj (14)
The associated first order conditions are, respectively,
(2 + β)(a− c) + (4− 3β)fBi + 2(2β − 1)fBj = 9(vi − sBi )fBi (15)
(1 + β)(a− c) + (2− 4β)fBi + (5β − 1)fBj = 9(vj − sBj )fBj (16)
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By Cramer’s rule, we obtain the following equilibrium levels of R&D invest-
ment:
xBi =
£
9(2 + β)(vj − sBj )− β(7 + β)
¤2
(a− c)2
D2
(17)
and
xBj =
£
9(1 + β)(vi − sBi )− β(7 + β)
¤2
(a− c)2
D2
(18)
where D =
£
9(vi − sBi ) + 3β − 4
¤ £
9(vj − sBj )− 5β + 1
¤
+ 4(2β − 1)2.
Given fBi and f
B
j , the licensing condition in Case 1 (11) is satisfied if β ≥
β∗∗i , β
∗∗
i =
14(vj−sj)−7(vi−si)−18(vi−si)(vj−sj)
3(vj−sj)−5(vi−si) . This implies that fixed-fee licensing
occurs when the diﬀerence in the eﬀective R&D costs (vi − si) between the
firms are small.
If only one firm invests in R&D, then the first order condition of maximizing
the innovating firm’s payoﬀ is8
(2 + β)(a− c) + (4− 3β)fi − 9vifi = 0 (19)
From this the equilibrium level of the innovating firm’s R&D investment is
xi =
(2 + β)2(a− c)2
[9vi − 4 + 3β]2
. (20)
Given the optimal cost reduction fi =
√
xi, the licensing condition in Case
2 (12) can be rewritten as β ≥ β∗i , β∗i = 14−18vi3 . This condition indicates
that fixed fee licensing occurs only when the innovating firm has relatively
high R&D cost, i.e. vi ≥ 14−3β18 . Moreover, if
6−2β
9
< vi <
14−3β
18
or vi ≤ 6−2β9 ,
then firm i does nearly drastic or drastic innovation and no fixed-fee licensing
occurs.
8If only one firm innovates, its government has no incentives to subsidize the firm’s
R&D investment, thus, si = 0. (See also below in stage 1).
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In the first stage, government i sets R&D subsidy rates si (i = 1, 2) on R&D
expenditure to maximize Gi. The first order condition of government i is:
dGi
dsi
=
dπi
dsi
− xi − si
dxi
dsi
= 0 (21)
By the envelope theorem,
dπi
dsi
=
∂πi
∂xj
dxj
dsi
+ xi (22)
Substituting (22) into (21), the optimal R&D subsidy rate is determined by
s∗i =
∂πi
∂xj
dxj
dsi
/
dxi
dsi
(23)
Where s∗i > 0 corresponds to R&D subsidy and s
∗
i < 0 to R&D tax.
The following propositions describe the optimal R&D policies under diﬀerent
cases:
Proposition 1 If only one firm (say, firm i) invests in R&D and licensing
occurs, i.e. vi ≥ 14−3β18 , the innovator’s government will not subsidize the
firm’s R&D investment.
Proof. The proof of this proposition is simple. If only firm i innovates,
then dπi
dsi
= xi, the first order condition of the innovating firm’s government
is simplified as ∂gi∂si = −si
dxi
dsi
= 0. Since dxi
dsi
is positive we have s∗i = 0.
The intuition is that governments’ intervention in R&D is justified by firms’
strategic interaction in their R&D competition. When only one firm un-
dertakes R&D, there is no R&D competition and no profit-shifting eﬀect
between the two firms. Therefore, the government of the innovator has no
incentive to intervene.
Proposition 2 If both firms compete in innovation market and licensing
occurs, i.e. β ≥ β∗∗i , then the optimal R&D policy for each government is,
respectively: s∗1 > 0 and s
∗
2 < 0 if β >
1
2
; s∗1 < 0 and s
∗
2 > 0 if β <
1
2
; and
s∗1 = s
∗
2 = 0 if β =
1
2
.
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Proof: See Appendix.
It is interesting to see that a government’s optimal R&D policy depends on
its domestic firm’s bargaining power over the total licensing gain, instead of
on its domestic firm’s competitive cost advantage in developing the technol-
ogy. When a firm’s bargaining power is greater than 1
2
, it is optimal for its
government to subsidize this firm’s R&D investment, regardless of whether
it is a licensor or a licensee. On the other hand, when a firm’s bargaining
power is less than 1
2
, the optimal R&D policy is a tax policy. When firms
have the same bargaining power, it is optimal for both governments not to
intervene in firms’ R&D investments.
Intuitively, this result is due to two eﬀects: the competition eﬀect and the
licensing eﬀect. Although an increase in government’s R&D subsidy unam-
biguously increases its own firm’s R&D investment (dxi
dsi
> 0), it has two op-
posite eﬀects on its rival firm’s R&D decision. On the one hand, it decreases
its rival’s R&D investment due to the competition eﬀect. On the other hand,
it increases its rival’s R&D investment due to the licensing eﬀect. The overall
eﬀect depends on how the licensing gain is split between firms. When one
firm has most of the bargaining power, the competition eﬀect dominates the
licensing eﬀect, and R&D subsidy curtails the rival firm’s R&D investment
(i.e.dxj
dsi
< 0). As a consequence, it is optimal for the government to subsidize
its firm’s R&D activities. Conversely, when a firm gains a smaller share from
the licensing deal, the licensing eﬀect dominates the competition eﬀect, and
R&D subsidy raises the rival’s R&D investment (i.e. dxj
dsi
> 0). As a result,
it is optimal for the government to tax its firm’s R&D investment. Finally,
when the Nash bargaining solution prevails, (β = 1
2
), the competition eﬀect
and the licensing eﬀect are balanced out, and the government’s R&D poli-
cies do not aﬀect the rival’s R&D decision (i.e. dxj
dsi
= 0). In this case, it is
optimal for the governments to stay laissez-faire.
This result contrasts the result in R&D subsidy literature where the licens-
ing eﬀect is neglected. In the absence of licensing, both governments have
the incentives to subsidize their domestic firms’ R&D investment (s∗1 > 0 and
s∗2 > 0), when the firms are engaging in strategic R&D rivalry. The R&D sub-
sidies from the governments support the firms’ tendency of overusing R&D
investments, which causes both countries become worse oﬀ. The feasibility
of international licensing, however, makes the two governments cooperate
11
to some extent and softens the firms’ excessive competition in innovation
market.
Now we want to show under which conditions the less eﬃcient firm prefers
not to invest in R&D. To answer the question, we compare firm 2’s payoﬀ
if it does not innovate itself and instead buys the innovation from firm 1
(πF2 ) to the payoﬀ it would earn when both firms innovate (π
B
2 ). It can be
shown that both firms will innovate if the less eﬃcient firm has most of the
bargaining power, i.e. πB2 > π
F
2 if β ≤ 12 . For β >
1
2
, firm 2 will innovate if
and only if its R&D eﬃciency (v2) is relatively high. Otherwise, it will prefer
not to innovate.
Proposition 3 Whether the less eﬃcient firm will invest in R&D depends
both on its bargaining power and its R&D costs. If β ≤ 1
2
, both firms will
innovate. If β > 1
2
the less eﬃcient firm innovates only if its R&D eﬃciency
is suﬃciently high.
Proof: See Appendix
The intuition is that, for β ≤ 1
2
, if both firms innovate, the less eﬃcient
firm is subsidized while the more eﬃcient firm is taxed. The firms become
relatively symmetric, and it is more profitable for the less eﬃcient firm to
invest in R&D as well. In doing so, it can not only share part of the li-
censing gain but also enhance its fall-back position during the bargaining
process (which increases its before-licensing operating profit by reducing its
production cost)9. However, if β > 1
2
, the less eﬃcient firm will be taxed
while its rival is subsidized. Firm 1’s advantage in developing the technology
will suﬃciently exceeds firm 2’s. In this case, firm 2 as the less eﬃcient firm
will prefer not to invest but to buy the technology from firm 1 if its R&D
eﬃciency (v2) is relatively low. It is shown in Appendix that if β > 12 and
v2 ≥ v∗2, (v∗2 is derived from πF2 = πB2 ), then πF2 ≥ πB2 ; and if β > 12 and v2 <
v∗2, then π
F
2 < π
B
2 .
9There is historical evidence that both firms will innovate to improve their bargaining
positions even if licensing after innovation occurs. For instance, ICI and Du Pont had a long
standing licensing agreement. Despite of that, Du Pont delibrately carried out research in
Polyethylene process technology, on which ICI had the basic patent. (See Taylor, G:D.,
and Sudnik, P.E., 1984, ”DU Pont and the international Chemical Industry”, G.K. Hall
and Co, Boston, MA.)
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Up to now, we have not identified the licensor from the licensee. An in-
teresting question to raise is whether the more eﬃcient firm (firm 1) is the
licensor? Indeed, with governments’ intervention in R&D, the less eﬃcient
firm (firm 2) may leapfrog and become licensor, especially when the less eﬃ-
cient firm has a big bargaining power and the firms are relatively symmetric
in R&D eﬃciencies. The following proposition pins down the licensor and
the licensee.
Proposition 4 If β ≥ 1
2
, then firm 1 is the licensor. If β < 1
2
, firm 1 is the
licensor if (v2 − v1) ≥ (sB2 − sB1 ), and firm 2 is the licensor if (v2 − v1) <
(sB2 − sB1 ).
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition is straightforward. When Nash bargaining solution prevails,
none of the governments intervene. Firm 1 becomes licensor because of its
higher R&D eﬃciency. When firm 1’s bargaining power is greater than 1/2,
it receives R&D subsidy while firm 2 must pay R&D tax. This eﬀectively
enlarges the original R&D eﬃciency diﬀerence between the firms and firm 1
maintains the licensor position. However, when firm 1’s share of licensing gain
is less than 1/2, firm 1 is taxed on its R&D activities while firm 2 is subsidized.
This eﬀectively lessens the firms’ original R&D eﬃciency diﬀerence, and can
eventually make firm 2 more eﬀectively eﬃcient than firm 1 and cause it to
become the licensor.
From the above propositions, we are ready to get the subgame perfect equi-
librium, which is described in the following Theorem:
Theorem 5 When fixed-fee licensing after innovation occurs, whether the
less eﬃcient firm will develop a new innovation itself depends both on its
bargaining power over licensing gain and on its R&D cost.
1. If β ≤ 1
2
or β > 1
2
and v2 ≤ v∗2, then both firms undertake R&D
investments. Governments’ R&D policies when licensing occurs depend
on the firms’ bargaining power over licensing gain:
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• If β 6= 1
2
, one firm is subsidized (firm 1 if β > 1
2
; firm 2, if β < 1
2
),
and the other firm is taxed (firm 1 if β < 1
2
; firm 2, if β > 1
2
).
• If β = 1
2
, the governments do not interfere in firms’ R&D activi-
ties.
2. If β > 1
2
and v2 > v∗2then only firm 1 innovates and then licenses to
firm 2. In this case the government of firm 1 does not subsidize its
domestic firm’s R&D investment.
Extension: Licensing with royalty per unit
In this section we want to check the robustness of the above results by in-
vestigating royalty per-unit licensing. Licensing with royalty per unit means
that the licensee’s payments are based on its output produced with the new
technology. According to Gallini and Winter (1985), the optimal royalty
rate is the diﬀerence between the licensor’s and the licensee’s unit produc-
tion costs. That is, r = fi − fj (here firm i is still the licensor and firm j the
licensee). The net gain under royalty licensing is the product of the optimal
royalty rate and the licensee’s output produced with the new technology, i.e.
E = rqj. Therefore, the firms’ total payoﬀs are:
πTi = pqi − (c− fi)qi − (vi − si)xi + β(fi − fj)qj (24)
πTj = pqj − (c− fj)qj − (vj − sj)xj + (1− β)(fi − fj)qj (25)
Unlike fixed-fee licensing, the firms’ equilibrium outputs after licensing with
royalty per unit are diﬀerent and are given, respectively, by
qBRi =
a− c+ (1 + β)fBRi − βfBRj
3
(26)
qBRj =
a− c+ (1− 2β)fBRi + 2βfBRj
3
(27)
If only one firm (say, firm i) innovates, then the firms’ outputs are
qRi =
a− c+ (1 + β)fi
3
(28)
qRj =
a− c+ (1− 2β)fi
3
(29)
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Before licensing with royalty per unit the firms’ outputs are the same as those
in fixed-fee licensing (8).
Note that, diﬀerent from fixed-fee licensing, the licensor under royalty licens-
ing may deliberately distort the licensee’s unit production cost to its own
advantage through royalty rate. Under royalty licensing, the eﬀective cost of
the licensee is c− [βfi + (1− β)fj] , which depends not only on the optimal
royalty rate but also explicitly on its bargaining power, while the licensor’s
unit cost is c− fi.
In the licensing stage, the licensee is always willing to reach a licensing agree-
ment, regardless of its bargaining power over the licensing gain. This is be-
cause its benefit from the cost reduction by using the licensor’s technology
is at least as large as the royalty payment. Whether the licensor has incen-
tives to sell its superior technology to its competitor depends crucially on its
bargaining power. In the existing licensing literature it is usually assumed
that the licensor has all the bargaining power. On this assumption, licensing
with royalty per unit always occurs, because the licensor can always enjoy
a positive net gain (the amount of the licensee’s cost reduction) by leav-
ing the licensee indiﬀerent between licensing and not licensing. However,
when the licensee is allowed to share the licensing gain with the licensor, a
stronger bargaining position of the licensee means also a stronger position in
the after-licensing production competition of the licensee. For the licensor,
it has incentive to license only if its share of licensing gain is so high that
its total payoﬀ is at least as high as its pre-licensing profit, i.e.πTi − π0i ≥ 0.
This gives rise to the condition β ≥ β, where β is the threshold, at which
πTi −π0i = 0.10 Licensing with royalty per unit occurs only if β ≥ β. When β
is smaller than β, the licensor’s licensing gain could not compensate for its
loss due to the enhanced competition from the licensee following the licensing
deal. The licensor has thereby no incentives to engage in licensing.
Furthermore, if one firm (firm i) undertakes a drastic innovation ( fi ≥
a − c + 2fj), and becomes monopoly, then royalty licensing will not occur
either. Therefore, the occurrence of royalty per-unit licensing requires two
conditions. That is,
10The β is unique root to (5β − 2)(a− c+ fi) + (5β2+1)(fj − fi) = 0. It can be shown
that β < 12 .
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Proposition 6 Under royalty licensing, licensing occurs only if the condi-
tions β ≥ β and fi < (a− c+ 2fj)are both satisfied.
In the Innovation stage, firms choose their optimal levels of R&D investments
by maximizing their total payoﬀs. The optimal R&D investments under
royalty licensing are, respectively,
xBRi =
81
£
(2 + 5β)(vj − sj)− 18β2
¤2
(a− c)2
E2
(30)
xBRj =
182β2 [2(vi − si)− β]2 (a− c)2
E2
(31)
where E = 2
£
9(vi − si) + 5β2 − 5β − 1
¤ £
9(vj − sj)− 4β2
¤
+ 10β2(1− 2β)2.
If only one firm innovates, then this firm’s (firm i’s) R&D investment is
xRi =
(2 + 5β)2(a− c)2
4(9v1 + 5β
2 − 5β − 1)2
(32)
In the first stage, similar to the case of fixed-fee licensing, the optimal R&D
subsidy or tax rates of governments are determined by: s∗i =
∂πi
∂xj
dxj
dsi
/dxi
dsi
.
The equilibrium R&D policies under royalty licensing are described in the
following proposition:
Proposition 7 If both firm innovate and royalty licensing occurs, then the
governments’ optimal R&D subsidy rates are: sBR1 > 0 and s
BR
2 < 0 if β >
1
2
;
sBR1 < 0 and s
BR
2 > 0 if β <
1
2
; and sBR1 = s
BR
2 = 0 if β =
1
2
. When only
the more eﬃcient firm innovates, then the innovating firm’s government will
not intervene in the firm’s R&D investment.
Proof: See Appendix
This proposition means that a government’s decision on whether to subsidize
or tax its domestic firm’s R&D again depends on its domestic firm’s bargain-
ing power over licensing gain. Just like in the fixed-fee licensing, with R&D
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rivalry, the government will subsidize R&D if and only if its domestic firm
appropriates higher share of licensing gain than the rival firm. Otherwise the
government will either tax the firm’s R&D investment or does not intervene
in R&D. However, the equilibrium amount of R&D subsidies or taxes will be
diﬀerent under diﬀerent licensing contracts.
Moreover, the less eﬃcient firm’s decision on whether to innovate is similar
to the case of fixed-fee licensing. If firm 1 has most of the bargaining power,
firm 2 will innovate only when its R&D eﬃciency is suﬃciently high. If firm
2 has higher bargaining power than firm 1, both firms innovate. In this
case, under some circumstances, firm 2 leapfrogs the more eﬃcient firm in
its R&D investment and becomes the licensor. The following proposition
describes this.
Proposition 8 When β ≥ 1
2
, firm 1 is licensor. When β ≤ β < 1
2
, firm 1 is
licensor if the diﬀerence of the firms’ R&D eﬃciency is high, i.e. (v2− v1) ≥
(s∗2 − s∗1), and firm 2 becomes licensor if the firms are relatively symmetric
(v2 − v1) < (s∗2 − s∗1).
From the above propositions, it is trivial to get the following subgame perfect
equilibrium:
Theorem 9 When licensing with royalty per unit after innovation occurs,
the firms’ and governments’ equilibrium behaviors are the following:
1. If β ≤ β ≤ 1
2
or β > 1
2
and v2 ≤ vL∗2 , 11both firms innovate and royalty
licensing occurs. Governments’ R&D policies depends on β.
• If β ≥ β and β 6= 1
2
, one firm is subsidized (firm 1 if β > 1
2
; firm
2, if β < 1
2
), and the other firm is taxed (firm 1 if β < 1
2
; firm 2,
if β > 1
2
).
• If β = 1
2
, governments neither subsidize nor tax their firms’ R&D
investments.
2. If β > 1
2
and v2 > vL∗2 ,then only firm 1 invests in R&D. Firm 1’s
government does not subsidize its R&D investment.
11Here vL∗2 is the critical level at which firm 2 is indiﬀerent between not innovating (and
being a licensee) and innovating.
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Conclusion
This paper investigates firms’ R&D rivalry as well as the governments’ op-
timal R&D policies by incorporating international licensing. The possibility
of international licensing alters both the firms’ and the governments’ equi-
librium behaviors in comparison to the case without licensing. First, antic-
ipating that it can buy a new technology from its rival firm, a less eﬃcient
firm prefers not to invest in R&D if it has less bargaining power and its R&D
cost is relatively high. If the less eﬃcient firm has most of the bargaining
power or its R&D cost is not very high, both firms will invest in R&D. In this
case, the less eﬃcient firm may leapfrog the more eﬃcient firm and become
the licensor. Second, the governments’ designing of optimal R&D policies
is also aﬀected by the possibility of international licensing. With only one
firm innovating, the innovator’s government has no incentive to subsidize its
domestic firm’s R&D investment. When both firms innovate and licensing
occurs, whether to subsidize or to tax its domestic firm’s R&D activities cru-
cially depend on firms’ bargaining power over licensing gain. A government
subsidizes its domestic firm’s R&D when the firm has most of the bargaining
power, while taxes it when the firm only has a weak bargaining position.
When the firms have the same bargaining position in the licensing deal, then
it is optimal for the governments not to intervene in R&D. This result is
robust to diﬀerent types of licensing contracts.
Our findings should be useful for a government in designing its optimal R&D
policies for international R&D- and licensing-intensive industries. The target
of a firm’s R&D eﬃciency and its bargaining power during the licensing pro-
cess should be scrutinized before the policies are made. When the domestic
firm is in a position to appropriate the larger share of the licensing gain, it
is optimal for the government to subsidize the firm. Otherwise, laissez-faire
or R&D tax policy may be optimal. A government’s attempt to subsidize its
R&D ineﬃcient firm to leapfrog can only make sense when the firm is able to
benefit mostly from the licensing deal and the firms are relatively symmetric
in R&D eﬃciency. To this extent, the usual assumption of the licensor hav-
ing all the bargaining power in the existing R&D subsidy literature can lead
to suboptimal, if not wrong, R&D policies.
18
2 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2 :
When firm 1 is licensor and firm 2 is licensee and fixed-fee licensing occurs,
the following results can be derived.
∂π1
dx2
= − 1
9
√
x2
£
(1 + β)(a− c) + 2(1− 2β)√x1 − (1− 5β)
√
x2
¤
< 0,
∂π2
dx1
= − 1
9
√
x1
£
β(a− c) + (2− 3β)√x1 − 2(1− 2β)
√
x2
¤
< 0,
dx2
ds1
=
36(1−2β)√x1
√
x2
D
> 0,iﬀ β < 1
2
, and
dx1
ds2
=
36(2β−1)√x1
√
x2
D
> 0,iﬀ β > 1
2
.
Where D =
£
9(v1 − sB1 )− 4 + 3β
¤ £
9(v2 − sB2 )− 5β + 1
¤
+ 4(2β − 1)2
Furthermore, since dx1
ds1
> 0 and dx2
ds2
> 0, from the f.o.c. of the governments,
it is trivial that for the licensor’s government, s∗1 > 0 iﬀ β >
1
2
, s∗1 < 0
iﬀ β < 1
2
and s∗1 = 0 if otherwise. While for the licensee’s government, its
optimal subsidy rate is given by s∗2 > 0 iﬀ β <
1
2
, s∗2 < 0 iﬀ β >
1
2
and s∗2 = 0
if otherwise.
Proof of proposition 3:
(1) πB2 − πF2
=
(a−c+2fB2 −fB1 )2
9
− (a−c−f1)
2
9
+ (1 − β) (f
B
1 −fB2 )[2(a−c)−3fB1 +5fB2 ]−f1[2(a−c)−3f1]
9
−
(v2 − s2)(fB2 )2
=
(fB1 −f1)
9
£
−2β(a− c) + (3β − 2)(f1 + fB1 )
¤
+
[9(v2−s2)−5β+1](fB2 )2
9
(2) From the first order conditions
(a). (2 + β)(a− c) + (4− 3β)f1 = 9v1f1
(b). (2 + β)(a− c) + (4− 3β)fB1 + 2(2β − 1)fB2 = 9(v1 − sB1 )fB1
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(a)− (b)⇒ (9vi − 4 + 3β)(f1 − fB1 ) = 2(1− 2β)fB2 − 9sB1 fB1
When β = 1
2
⇒ sB1 = 0⇒ fB1 = f1
When β < 1
2
⇒ sB1 < 0⇒ fB1 < f1
When β > 1
2
⇒ sB1 > 0⇒ fB1 > f1.
Therefore we have
If β = 1
2
, then πB2 − πF2 =
[9(v2−s2)−5β+1](fB2 )2
9
> 0⇒ πB2 > πF2
If β < 1
2
, then πB2 −πF2 =
(fB1 −f1)
9
£
−2β(a− c) + (3β − 2)(f1 + fB1 )
¤
+
[9(v2−s2)−5β+1](fB2 )2
9
,
where (fB1 − f1) < 0,
£
−2β(a− c) + (3β − 2)(f1 + fB1 )
¤
< 0
and [9(v2−s2)−5β+1](f
B
2 )
2
9
> 0⇒ πB2 > πF2 .
If β > 1
2
, then πB2 − πF2 can be positive or negative, depending on v2.
Since d(π
F
2 −π
B)
2
dv2
= −dπ
B
2
dv2
where dπ
B
2
dv2
=
∂πB2
∂x1
dx1
dv2
− x2.
Since dg2
dsB2
=
∂πB2
∂xB1
dxB1
dsB2
− sB2
dxB2
dsB2
= 0
⇒ sB2 = (
∂πB2
∂xB1
.
dxB1
dsB2
)/
dxB2
dsB2
where dx
B
1
dsB2
=
36(2β−1)
√
xB1
√
xB2
D
, and
dxB2
dsB2
=
18[9(v1−sB1 )−4+3β]xB2
D
⇒ ∂π
B
2
∂xB1
=
[9(v1−sB1 )−4+3β]sB2
2(2β−1) .
√
xB2√
xB1
Moreover, it is proved that dx
B
1
dv2
= 36(1−2β)
D
p
xB1
p
xB2
⇒ dπ
B
2
dv2
= −x
B
2
A
£
9(v1 − sB1 )− 4 + 3β
¤ £
9v2 + 9s
B
2 − 5β + 1 + 4(2β − 1)2
¤
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< 0
Therefore, d(π
F
2 −π
B)
2
dv2
= −dπ
B
2
dv2
> 0. i.e.
∀ v∗2 s.t. if v2 ≥ v∗2, firm 2 prefers not to invest in R&D; if v2 < v∗2, both
firms invest in R&D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
If β = 1
2
, then sB1 = s
B
2 = 0. Since v1 < v2, we have v1 − sB1 < v2 − sB2 , and
therefore fB1 > f
B
2 , firm 1 is the licensor.
If β > 1
2
, then sB1 > 0, s
B
2 < 0. Since v1 < v2, we have v1− sB1 < v2− sB2 , and
thus fB1 > f
B
2 , firm 1 is still the licensor.
If β < 1
2
, then sB1 < 0, s
B
2 > 0. we have v1 − sB1 < v2 − sB2 if and only if
(v2−v1) ≥ (sB2 − sB1 ). If the firms are relatively symmetric in R&D eﬃciency
such that (v2 − v1) < (sB2 − sB1 ), then fB1 < fB2 , firm 2 becomes licensor.
Proof of Proposition 5:
The licensor’s payoﬀs after and before royalty licensing are πTi and π
0
i , re-
spectively.
πTi =
£
qBRi
¤2
+ β(fi − fj)qBRj − (vi − si)xi
π0i = [q
0
i ]
2 − (vi − si)xi
πTi − π0i =
h
a−c+(β+1)fi−βfj
3
i2
−
h
a−c+2fi−fj
3
i2
+ β(fi − fj)a−c+(1−2β)fi+2βfj3
=
[2(a−c)+(3+β)fi−(β+1)fj ][(β−1)(fi−fj)]
9
+ β(fi − fj)a−c+(1−2β)fi+2βfj3
=
(fi−fj)
9
{[2(a− c) + (3 + β)fi − (β + 1)fj] (β − 1) + 3β [a− c+ (1− 2β)fi + 2βfj]}
=
(fi−fj)
9
£
(5β − 2)(a− c) + (5β − 3− 5β2)fi + (5β2 + 1)fj
¤
⇒if (5β − 2)(a− c) + (5β − 3− 5β2)fi + (5β2 + 1)fj ≥ 0,
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then πTi ≥ π0i , and firm i is willing to engage in licensing.
(The proof for the case of one firm innovating is similar.)
Proof of proposition 7:
When firm 1 is the licensor and firm 2 is the licensee and the royalty licensing
occurs, the following results can be derived:
∂πT1
∂x2
= −5β
3
f 02q2 < 0, and
∂πT2
∂x1
= − (4−2β)
3
f 01q2 < 0
dx2
ds1
= 72β(1−2β)f1..f2
E
,
where E = 2
£
9(v1 − s1) + 5β2 − 5β − 1
¤ £
9(v2 − s2)− 4β2
¤
+10β2(1− 2β)2.
⇒ dx2
ds1
> 0 iﬀ β < 1
2
, and dx2
ds1
< 0 iﬀ β > 1
2
.
Furthermore, since, dx1
ds1
> 0, dx2
ds2
> 0, from the f.o.c. of the governments, it is
readily proved that for the licensor’s government, sBR1 > 0 iﬀ β >
1
2
, sBR1 < 0
iﬀ β < 1
2
,and sBR1 = 0 if otherwise. While for the licensee’s government, its
optimal subsidy rate is given by sBR2 > 0 iﬀ β <
1
2
, sBR2 < 0 iﬀ β >
1
2
and
sBR2 = 0 if otherwise.
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